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MICHIGAN'S UNITARY SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE: A
COMPARISON WITH ILLINOIS' TWO-TIER APPROACH
JOHN H. GILLIS*
ELAINE FIELDMAN**
Since 1960, forty-six states have followed California's lead in for-
mulating new administrative systems to deal more effectively with the
problem of judicial misconduct and incompetence.' On August 6, 1968,
Michigan voters ratified a constitutional provision authorizing the Michigan
Supreme Court, upon recommendation of a newly created Judicial Tenure
Commission, 2 to "censure, suspend .... retire or remove" 3 a judge for
prescribed misconduct or disability.
Prior to the adoption of the Judicial Tenure Commission, the only
method for removing a judge in Michigan was through either legislative
impeachment "for corrupt conduct and misdemeanors," 4 or removal by the
governor for reasonable cause subject to the approval of two-thirds vote in
each house of the state legislature. 5 Both impeachment and removal were
impractical and ineffective in handling the widely varying degrees of judi-
cial misconduct. Application of these procedures were limited to instances
of outright criminal conduct or corruption.6 There were no provisions for
handling physical or mental disabilities and misconduct not amounting to
criminal conduct.
7
* Judge of the Michigan Court of Appeals; J.D., University of Detroit School of Law;
member of the Michigan Bar.
** Law clerk to Associate Justice Charles Levin of the Supreme Court of Michigan; J.D.,
University of Detroit; member of the Michigan Bar.
1. Winters, Retrospect, 60 JuD. 361 (1977).
2. MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 30(1) [hereinafter referred to in the text as the Commission].
3. MICH. CONST. art 6, § 30(2).
4. MICH.CONST. art. 11, § 7.
5. MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 25.
6. This article does not address the procedures and history of impeachment and removal.
Both provisions remain in the Michigan Constitution and are mentioned here only for the
purpose of background material.
7. The Michigan Supreme Court does have superintending control over the courts and
judiciary of the state. MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 4; MICH. GEN. CT. R. 711 and 930. These are
procedures that may be used to correct specific injustices, often of the same subject matter as
that of a Judicial Tenure Commission proceeding. Berkley v. Holmes, 34 Mich. App. 417, 427
n.7, 191 N.W.2d 561, 566 n.7 (1971). The supreme court pursuant to its superintending control
powers may recommend removal or impeachment but may not itself remove, retire or suspend
a judge. Ransford v. Graham, 374 Mich. 104, 131 N.W.2d 201 (1964); In re Graham, 366 Mich.
268, 114 N.W.2d 333 (1962). It is interesting to note, however, that under rule 930.8(2), the
supreme court may disbar a judge which in most instances makes him or her unqualified to be a
judge. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 930.8(2). This would not automatically remove the judge however.
See In re Kapcia, 389 Mich. 306, 205 N.W.2d 436 (1973).
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Generally, the judicial discipline plans adopted by the various states
perform three basic functions: (1) investigation and charging; (2) hearing
and findings; and (3) final disposition and resolution. Two different systems
have evolved for implementing these functions. These are the "unitary"
and the "two-tier" systems.
Michigan utilizes the unitary system of judicial discipline which is
patterned after the California plan. 8 The unitary system is designed to
operate within the state's regular court system and consists of a board or
commission which carries out the combined functions of investigation,
charging and hearing. Commission findings are then passed on to the state
supreme court for final disposition and disciplinary action if necessary.
Illinois, for example, utilizes the two-tier system. This administrative
scheme operates independently from the state's judicial system and consists
of two boards. One board investigates and charges. The second board, the
adjudicatory board, makes factual and legal findings and determines the
final disposition.
The purpose of this article is to explain Michigan's unitary system of
judicial discipline. Primary emphasis will be devoted to a discussion of
prehearing stage procedures. 9 Further, this article will compare and contrast
the unitary and two-tier systems. In doing so, it will be concluded that the
unitary approach is more effective and efficient. Throughout this compara-
tive analysis, the Illinois and Michigan judicial disciplinary plans will
exemplify the two-tier and unitary systems respectively.
BACKGROUND: THE GOALs OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
The goals of any judicial disciplinary system are to insure that the
judiciary remains competent and that the public retains confidence in the
judiciary. In order to attain these goals, the disciplinary structure must
perform its investigation, hearing and disposition functions effectively and
efficiently. To be truly effective and efficient, it is submitted that every
system must include the following four essential ingredients: (1) conscien-
tious commission members and staff; (2) public awareness of the discipli-
nary agency; (3) easy access to the discipline board coupled with the swift
processing of grievances; and (4) investigatory confidentiality.
8. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 18. For specific differences in the procedures of Michigan and
California compare MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932 with CAL. CT. R. 901-922. Discussions of these
differences, where relevant, are contained within various sections of this article.
9. The Michigan court rules pertaining to the hearing (MICH. GEN. CT. R. 930.7) and post
hearing stage (MICH. GEN. CT. R. 930.8-930.9) of judicial discipline proceedings are more
complete than the rules pertaining to the prehearing stage. For example, methods of investiga-
tion are not contained within the court rules.
In order to inform the reader of information possibly unavailable elsewhere, the focus of
this article is on the prehearing stage.
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Commission Members and Staff
A staff comprised of vigorous public servants can act to deter judicial
dishonesty, laziness and prejudice by merely communicating to the bench
that it will investigate every complaint. Such participants should be chosen
according to the highest standards of legal competence so that the system
can effectively implement such a policy. It is also important that these
individuals are prepared to accept the possibility that they may alienate
judges while serving as an investigator of judicial misconduct. There is no
room for a staff member or commissioner who is worred about his or her
future contact with the judge under investigation.
Public Awareness
The success of judicial discipline systems depends on information
supplied by the public. It is therefore imperative that the general public be
informed of the existence of the commission. Without such knowledge,
complaints remain unvoiced and the commission becomes dormant.
The public may be made aware of the existence and functions of their
state judicial disciplinary system in various ways. First, the best vehicle for
transmitting this information to the public is the state bar association. Often
individual complaints are voiced to an attorney at the time of the alleged
misconduct or when the grievant telephones an attorney or the state bar
seeking a remedy. Various sources could be used to insure that the bar keeps
current on the matter of judicial discipline. In Michigan, for example, the
bar participates in the election of commission members. Second, media
coverage of formal hearings also provides information to the public that a
judicial disciplinary system is available in their state by including within
such coverage a summary of the proceedings and functions of the discipli-
nary agency. Third, legal publications and bar journals help to keep attor-
neys up to date. Fourth, law school ethics courses should also serve to keep
future bar members informed of judicial disciplinary boards and the proce-
dures governing them.
Attorneys not only serve to inform the public but they are probably the
best source of meritorious grievances. As a professional, the attorney is
aware of the distinction between judicial misconduct and judicial discretion.
This knowledge serves two purposes. First, it increases the likelihood that a
grievance filed by an attorney will be a request for a review of judicial
misconduct and not the merits of a case. Secondly, an attorney may notice
infractions that a lay person would have overlooked. In addition, many
attorneys have occasion to appear before the same judges on a regular basis
and have many opportunities to observe their demeanor and conduct. Court
employees may also serve as a source since they not only have an opportuni-
ty to observe the judge on a continuing basis but frequently communicate
and interact with their judge as well.
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Access to the Board and Processing of Grievances
In order to achieve public participation, it is necessary that the commis-
sion be accessible and that the grievances be processed swiftly. This re-
quires an office staff that is well informed of the procedures to be followed
in filing grievances. Standard grievance forms help facilitate participation
and processing by providing the grievant with an easy and efficient method
of communicating his or her complaint and insuring that all of the essential
information is recorded.
In jurisdictions that receive a considerable amount of grievances,
people power is important. However, as in most governmental agencies, the
problem is that there are not enough people to do the work. Locating the
commission office in a large city of the state or in the state capital where the
greatest amount of informational resources are readily available might help
to ease staff shortage problems. Another timesaving device would be the
maintenance of a complete file on every grievance which is cross-indexed
according to judge and grievant. These files may help to gather witnesses
and establish patterns. They would also indicate whether similiar complaints
have been made against the particular judge and whether the particular
grievant has complained previously, against whom and the disposition of his
or her case.
The natural result of public awareness and easy accessibility is an
increase in the number of grievances that are filed. Many grievances are
frivolous or do not relate to judicial misconduct. For this reason, it is
necessary to weed out those types of grievances as quickly as possible in
order to leave ample time and staff to investigate the meritorious grievances.
Investigatory Confidentiality
Investigatory confidentiality is required during this weeding out pro-
cess so that the judge is protected from frivolous attacks and litigants and
attorneys are encouraged to report their grievances without fear of reprisal
from the judge. If all grievances were publicly announced, meritless com-
plaints could have irreversible ramifications. For example, a grievance
made in bad faith might be intentionally timed during the apex of a judge's
election campaign; thus, leaving no time before election day to investigate
and communicate the truth. The mere allegation of impropriety could have
disasterous effects on the judge's reputation then and in the future. The
Michigan commission has received unfounded grievances from individuals
accusing various judges of running prostitution houses and dope dens. I0
10. Due to the confidentiality of these grievances, specific documentation is not publicly
available.
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Public knowledge of a disciplinary investigation regarding such matters
often cloaks an ill-founded complaint with a veil of credibility regardless of
an announcement by a disciplinary body that the grievance was unfounded.
Thus, confidential investigations are necessary in order to: (1) protect the
judge's reputation until such time as public disclosure is warranted; and (2)
avoid burdening such judges with defending against untruthful allegations.
Further, many attorneys, court employees and litigants might refrain
from filing grievances out of fear of prejudicing the judge against their case
if they are then appearing before that judge or appear before him on a regular
basis. The best solution to this problem is to keep the grievant's name
confidential until such time as it is necessary to reveal that information.
While investigatory confidentiality applies only to the disciplinary
commission and its staff, there is nothing to stop the grievant from disclos-
ing to the press or other sources that he or she has filed a complaint."I
Likewise, a judge cannot be forced to withhold information that he or she
has been approached by the commission. It is to the advantage of the
grievant, however, to remain silent. In situations in which the judge's
courtroom is monitored, the announcement of the investigation by the
grievant could easily trigger a temporary change in the judge's courtroom
demeanor. In situations where individuals announce grievances or the press
somehow receives and prints information regarding an investigation, it may
become necessary for a disciplinary commission to break the confidentiality
rule and release certain clarifying information. Most jurisdictions, including
Michigan, have provisions within their rules as to what type of information
may be released in such circumstances. 12
It is interesting to note that the California Rules of Court provide that
all suspect judges shall be: (1) notified of any preliminary investigation in
response to an initial grievance; (2) notified of the grievant's name; and (3)
given an opportunity to respond at any time during the course of such
preliminary investigations.1 3 It is unclear at what point this notice must be
given. If it is required that the judge be notified at the initiation of the
preliminary investigation, this could hamper the investigation in much the
same way as a grievant's public announcement. It is submitted that the
11. But see Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 699, 233 S.E.2d
120, prob. juris. noted, 97 S. Ct. 2919 (1977), in which the Virginia Supreme Court upheld
against first amendment challenges a statute that makes it a misdemeanor for anyone to breach
the confidentiality of proceedings before the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission.
In that case, the defendant, a publisher of a newspaper, was found guilty of violating the statute
because of an article that identified the name of a judge under investigation.
12. MICH. GEN. Cr. R. 932.22(a); see also In re Del Rio, - Mich. -,-, 256 N.W.2d 727,
732-33 (1977).
13. CAL. CT. R. 904(b).
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better practice is to notify the judge after the preliminary investigation
unless circumstances are such that delayed notification would serve no
investigatory purpose and equity demands the judge be given an opportunity
to be heard at this preliminary stage.
Both Michigan and Illinois require that the judge be notified of the
charges and given an opportunity to respond prior to the filing of the formal
public complaint. The Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board Rules mandate that the
judge not be informed of the grievant's name unless the circumstances
require such disclosure. 14 In Michigan, there is no requirement that the
grievant's name be either withheld or disclosed. 15 These authors favor
withholding the identity of the grievant in many situations such as when the
grievant is an attorney or court employee. If anonymity is not preserved,
many individuals might refrain from filing grievances. The temporary with-
holding of the grievant's name encourages such filing and aids in obtaining
evidence during the investigation.
The Illinois and Michigan systems further provide that the investigation
remain confidential until the formal complaint is filed by the investigatory
commissions 16 while the California system retains confidentiality until the
case is later filed with its state supreme court for final disposition.' 7 Once a
meritorious complaint is made public, public hearings serve two purposes.
First they educate the public and second, the announcement of formal
charges can spark additional witnesses to come forward. The potential
imposition of sanctions, such as removal and suspension, are harsh penalties
which require the thorough accountability that only public hearings can
provide. The public has a right to know and observe the type of evidence
required to remove their judicial officers. Thorough investigations are es-
sential to lessen the likelihood that public charges cannot be sustained.
THE MICHIGAN JUDICIAL TENURE COMMISSION
Jurisdiction and Organization
The Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission' 8 has jurisdiction over all
judges, magistrates, and referees serving in the Michigan judicial system.' 9
14. ILL. JUDICIAL INQUIRY BD. R. 4(e).
15. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.7(b).
16. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 15, ILL. JUDICIAL INQUIRY BD. R. 5(a); MICH. GEN. CT. R.
932.8(b) and 932.22.
17. CAL. CT. R. 902.
18. Hereinafter the Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission will be referred to in the text as
the Commission. Pursuant to rule 932. l(4)(d) the Commission is given the power to hire a staff.
MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.1(4)(d). The expenses of the Commission are paid from the Michigan
Supreme Court appropriations (MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932. l(4)(b)) and the Supreme Court must
approve its budget (MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.1(4)(a)).
19. The Michigan Constitution provides for the discipline of judges pursuant to Commis-
sion recommendations, MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 30. Judge is defined in the court rules as a
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The Commission has the authority to discipline a judge for conduct which
occurred prior to the taking of judicial office20 and also for grievances filed
against part-time judges regarding their private law practices. 21
The Commission consists of nine commissioners who hold office for
three-year terms. 22 Four commissioners are judges elected by the judges of
the courts in which they serve: one court of appeals judge, one circuit judge,
one probate judge, and one judge from a court of limited jurisdiction. 23 The
members of the state bar of Michigan elect three commissioners, one judge
and two non-judges. 24 Two commissioners are appointed by the governor. 25
These appointees may not be judges, retired judges or state bar members.26
Since its inception in 1969, 915 grievances have been filed with the
Commission. 27 During the past year, there has been an upswing in the filing
of complaints and the commission now receives approximately twenty
grievances per month.
"Justice or Judge of any appellate court or any trial court or a magistrate or referee of any court
appointed or elected pursuant to any laws of this State." MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.3(b). The
following table delineates the number of judges in each of the Michigan courts:
Supreme Court 7
Court of Appeals 18
Circuit Court 147
Recorder's Court for
City of Detroit 23
Common-Pleas-Detroit 13
Probate Court 105
District Court 188
District Court
Magistrates 124
Municipal Court 36
Recorder's Court-Traffic
& Ordinance Referees 9
Probate Court Referees 63
713
All of the judges, referees and magistrates are fulltime judicial officers with three excep-
tions. Twenty-nine probate judges in rural areas of the state, many probate court referees, and
all but one of the municipal court judges are part-time judges, who are permitted to practice
law.
All of the judges and traffic court referees must be attorneys. MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 19;
MICH. COMp. LAWS §§ 168.391, 168.409, 168.411, 168.425, 168.431, 600.1481, 725.1, 728.3
(1949). The magistrates and probate court referees need not be attorneys. MICH. COMP. LAWS §
600.8507 (1948). The magistrates function in a highly limited capacity. Included within their
authority is the power to accept guilty pleas on minor offenses, arraign defendants and set bond
in the absence of the district court judge. The magistrates do not conduct trials of any nature.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.8511 (1948).
20. In re Ryman, 394 Mich. 637, 644, 232 N.W.2d 178, 179 (1975).
21. MICH. STATE BAR GRIEVANCE BD. P. & AD. R.. 16.6, § 2.
22. MIcH. CONST. art. 6, § 30(1); MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.1(1).
23. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.1(1).
24. Id.
25. MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 30(1).
26. Id.
27. Annual reports are prepared in June of each year containing the number of grievances
filed. This statistic was provided by the executive director of the Commission, Brian J.
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Filing Grievances and Initiating Investigations
A Commission investigation concerning the conduct or disability of
any judge may be triggered in one of four ways. First, an individual may file
a verified complaint or grievance.28 Second, the State Bar Grievance Board
may request investigation.29 Third, the Chief Justice of the Michigan Su-
preme Court3" or State Court Administrator may request an investigation. 31
Finally, the Commission on its own motion may begin an investigation. 32
An individual grievance is usually initiated by phone or letter. 33 Often
the commission receives telephone calls or letters in which the com-
municator refuses to reveal his or her name. Anonymous tips and grievances
are investigated by the Commission on its own motion. Other sources also
initiate sua sponte Commission investigations. For example, a newspaper
article stating that a certain judge was arrested for drunk driving would
prompt a Commission inquiry into the matter. It is the policy of the
Commission to investigate every complaint. 34
Any judge who is the subject of such an investigation may be mailed a
copy of the grievance prior to investigation. 35 This procedure is used most
often in a situation involving only the grievant and the judge in which no
third party has any information regarding the matter. To illustrate, if an
individual litigant files a grievance stating that a judge privately pressured
him into settling a case and no one else was present during the conversation
or knew that there was a private conference, a copy of the grievance might
be mailed to the judge and the judge would be given an opportunity to
respond. The practice of notifying the judge of a grievance is not utilized if
the commission is of the opinion that such communication might hamper
further investigation or if the grievant does not wish the judge to be aware of
his or her identity at that time.
Preliminary Investigation
Once a grievance has been filed or one of the other triggering mecha-
nisms has occurred, a preliminary investigation is initiated.36 In Michigan,
McMahon, in an interview on May 4, 1977, because the 1976-77 report was not available on that
date.
28. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.7(a)(i).
29. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.7(a)(ii).
30. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.7(a)(iii).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Upon receiving the communication, the Commission mails a standard grievance form
to the grievant. The form is filled out under oath and mailed back to the Commission. Seldom
do individual grievants appear personally to file a grievance.
34. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.7(a).
35. There is no specific court rule for this practice. However, rule 932.7(b), although
usually used for the "15-day letter" discussed (see text accompanying notes 45-47 infra), could
be used in this situation. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.7(b).
36 MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.7(a).
MICHIGAN'S UNITARY SYSTEM
the Commission investigations are usually conducted by the executive
director and the staff attorneys. Other investigative sources, such as govern-
mental agencies and task forces, have on occasion aided the Commission in
its investigations. However, no formal relationship exists between those
agencies and the Commission. In addition, the Commission has the authori-
ty to hire private investigators, 37 but thus far this method has been used only
on rare occasions.
An investigation may involve a variety of techniques and resources.
Some of the more commonly used investigative methods include interview-
ing witnesses, criminal defendants, court personnel, police officers and
others who may have knowledge on the subject of the grievance. The
Commission may also examine documents including court files and trans-
cripts. It may further monitor the judge's courtroom by sitting in and
observing the way in which the judge conducts his or her court. The
monitoring technique is used most often in a court that is not a court of
record and when there is some allegation of offensive courtroom behavior.
Courtroom monitoring has never been conducted at random in Michigan. It
has always been initiated pursuant to a specific allegation or grievance
against a particular judge. 38
Commission Consideration of Investigative Findings
Following the preliminary investigation, the Commission staff prepares
a written report. A copy of this report is submitted to each commissioner by
mail along with a form ballot. If all of the commissioners vote to dismiss the
case, it is dismissed. 39 The vote of one commissioner to hold the case is
sufficient to invoke a meeting of all commissioners to discuss the matter. 40
If, at such a meeting, the commissioners determine that the preliminary
investigation does not establish sufficient cause to warrant the filing of a
formal complaint against the judge, the Commission may terminate its
investigation upon a majority vote of five commissioners 41 or recommend to
the state supreme court private censure stating the reasons for such cen-
sure. 42 Upon dismissal of the case, the grievant is notified of the commis-
sion's decision and its reasoning. 43
37. See MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.1(4)(d).
38. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.7(a).
39. MicH. GEN. CT. R. 932.21(a).
40. This procedure has been adopted by the Commission in Michigan under its indepen-
dent rule-making authority. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.2.
41. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.7(c); JUDICIAL TENURE COMM'N ADMIN. R. 2.
42. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.7(c). It should be pointed out that private supreme court
censure has never been recommended by the Commission.
43. According to administrative rule 4(1) the grievant must be notified of any disposition
of the grievance. JUDICIAL TENURE COMM'N ADMIN. R. 4(1). If the judge had been given notice
of the charges pursuant to rule 732.7(b) (MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.7(b)), he or she should be
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Oftentimes such grievances appear to be complaints of misconduct
when in actuality they are requests for the rehearing of a case in which the
grievant was dissatisfied with the judge's decision. For example, a criminal
defendant may claim that Judge Y was biased and prejudiced against him,
while the record reveals that the judge merely expressed his intolerance for
violent crimes while sentencing the defendant. In such cases, a letter is
mailed to the grievant explaining that the Commission does not review cases
but investigates only misconduct or incompetence and why his or her
particular grievance fits into the former category.
Written notice of the charges is sent to the judge if at least a majority of
five commissioners determine that the investigation discloses a reasonable
basis for the filing of a complaint." This notice contains a comprehensive
statement of the charges against the judge. It is also called the "15-day
letter" since the letter requests the judge to respond in writing or appear
before the Commission within fifteen days.45 However, it is not mandatory
that the judge respond or appear at this time. 6
A copy of the written response, if submitted, is given to each commis-
sioner. A meeting is then called for the purpose of discussing everything that
has occurred thus far, i.e., the investigation, the charges, the judge's
response and personal communication with the judge. A vote is then con-
ducted to determine whether the Commission should issue a formal public
complaint. 47 In making that decision, the commissioners consider: (1) the
appropriatness of other disciplinary alternatives such as Commission-or-
dered, non-public private reprimands for minor misbehavior; 48 (2) the suffi-
ciency of available evidence to support a formal complaint; and (3) whether
the judge's behavior or disability falls within the scope of the Commission's
jurisdiction. 49
Formal complaints may be issued upon a majority vote of five or more
commissioners. 5 If the commission so approves, the complaint is drafted,
notified of termination of the investigation or of the recommendation of private censure
pursuant to rule 932.7(c) (MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.7(c)). In addition, the judge may be advised of
the disposition if not previously notified of the charges. JUDICIAL TENURE COMM'N ADMIN. R.
4(2).
44. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.7(b).
45. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.9(a).
46. The court rule only states that the judge be given a reasonable opportunity to respond,
not that he or she must respond. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.7(b).
47. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.8(a).
48. This refers to private reprimands. See text accompanying notes 76-108 infra.
49. This article does not address what constitutes misconduct. That subject is best left to
specific cases and other articles. The reader is directed, however, to MICH. CONST. art. 6, §
30(2); MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.4; In re Ryman, 394 Mich. 637, 232 N.W.2d 178 (1975); In re
Kapcia, 389 Mich. 306,205 N.W.2d 436 (1973); In re Heideman, 387 Mich. 630, 198 N.W.2d 291
(1972), for the general description of what constitutes misconduct and specific Michigan
examples.
50. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.8(a), JUDICIAL TENURE COMM'N ADMIN. R. 2.
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filed in the commission's office and served upon the judge. 5' Up until this
point, the investigation and communications are kept confidential.52 After a
formal complaint is issued, it is publicly announced and made available for
public inspection. 53 The judge has fifteen days to answer the formal com-
plaint .5
Upon filing of the complaint, the Commission either sets a time for a
hearing before itself55 or petitions the state supreme court to appoint a
master to preside over a hearing. 6 At this time, the Commission may also
request that the state supreme court suspend a judge pending final adjudica-
tion of the complaint. 57 In Michigan, the Commission rarely presides over
the hearing. So far, the only time that this has occurred was when the
Commission determined that the facts were clearly not in dispute and the
only questions remaining after investigation were ones of law.58
The Hearing and Final Disposition
The hearing is public whether conducted before a master or the Com-
mission. 59 One or more examiners (usually Commission staff attorneys) are
appointed by the Commission to present the evidence in support of the
charges. 60 The charges must be established by clear and convincing evi-
dence.61 The hearing is conducted and recorded pursuant to the civil rules of
evidence and procedure. 62 The judge is entitled to be represented by coun-
sel63 but has no right to discovery proceedings.' 4
If the hearing has been conducted before a master, the master is to
submit a report along with a copy of the hearing transcript to the Commis-
sion within thirty days after the conclusion of the hearing.65 This report
contains a statement of the proceedings and findings of facts and conclu-
51. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.8(b).
52. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.22.
53. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.8(b).
54. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.9(a).
55. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.10(a).
56. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.10 and 932. 10(b).
57. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.20.
58. 389 Mich. 306, 309-10; 205 N.W.2d 436, 437-38 (1973).
59. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.11(a) and 932.22(b).
60. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.3(f) and 932.11(a); JUDICIAL TENURE COMM'N ADMIN. R. 5.
These examiners are usually Commission staff attorneys.
61. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.4. A disciplinary proceeding is civil rather than criminal in
nature. However, most jurisdictions require the evidence to be greater than a preponderance.
See In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303 (Alas. 1975); Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifica-
tions, 13 Cal. 3d 778, 532 P.2d 1209, 119 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1975); In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241 So.
2d 469 (1970); In re Diener, 304 A.2d 587 (Md. 1973).
62. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.11.
63. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.11(a).
64. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.13(a). See.In re Del Rio, - Mich. , -, 256 N.W.2d 727,734-
36 (1977); In re Mikesell, 396 Mich. 517, 531-33, 243 N.W.2d 86, 92-95 (1976).
65. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.15.
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sions of law. 6' The Commission then sends the judge a copy of the report
and transcript.67 The examiner and the judge are given an opportunity to file
objections to the master's report with the Commission. 68
The Commission then reviews the master's report and the objections
and either prepares written findings of fact and conclusions of law or adopts
the master's report in whole or in part. 69 The agreement of a majority of five
commissioners is required before a recommendation of discipline, removal,
retirement or suspension may be made to the state supreme court. 70 Lacking
the necessary votes, the Commission enters an order dismissing the case. 71
If the Commission recommends discipline, removal, retirement or
suspension, the entire record along with the Commission's recommenda-
tions is submitted to the state supreme court. 72 The judge is given an
opportunity to petition the supreme court to reject or modify the recom-
mendation of the Commission. 73 The supreme court makes an independent
review of the record and issues a written opinion directing the type of
disciplinary action, if any, that it deems proper. 74
THE Two-TIER SYSTEM: SUMMARY OF ITS PROCEDURES AND DIFFERENCES
FROM THE UNITARY SYSTEM
The Illinois two-tier system consists of two boards which are indepen-
dent of the state's court system: the investigative Judicial Inquiry Board75
and the adjudicatory Courts Commission. 76 The Judicial Inquiry Board is
composed of a total of nine board members: four lawyers and three laymen
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.16.
69. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.21(b).
70. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.21(a).
71. Id.
72. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.23.
73. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.24.
74. Whether the state supreme court may increase the Commission's recommendation is
an open question. It appears from the court rule that once the case goes to the supreme court, it
can order any form of discipline:
The Supreme Court shall review the record of the proceedings on the law and facts
and shall file a written opinion and judgment directing censure, removal, retirement,
suspension, or other disciplinary action as it finds just and proper, or reject or
modify, in whole or in part, the recommendations of the commission.
MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.25. However, the constitution states that "[o]n recommendation of the
judicial tenure commission, the supreme court may censure, suspend. . . , retire or remove a
judge . . . ." MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 30(2). The question remains, if the Commission recom-
mends suspension, does the supreme court have the power to remove.
Of course, if the Commission dismisses the case, the supreme court never obtains juris-
diction under rule 932. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.21, 932.23 and 932.24. But see note 7 supra for
other possible alternatives that the supreme court may utilize.
75. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 15(b).
76. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 15 (e).
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appointed by the governor and two circuit court judges selected by the state
supreme court. 77 Its functions are to conduct investigations, receive or
initiate complaints and file and prosecute formal complaints against
judges .78 As in Michigan, a majority vote of five members is required in
order to invoke formal proceedings. 79 The Courts Commission consists of
five judges: one state supreme court justice, two circuit court judges chosen
by the state supreme court, and two appellate judges appointed by the
appellate court. 8O The Courts Commission presides over the formal hearing
and renders a final decision which is nonappealable. 81 A majority vote of
three members is necessary to invoke disciplinary action which can range
from suspension to removal .12
Both the Judicial Inquiry Board and the Courts Commission are re-
quired by the Illinois Constitution to adopt rules governing their proce-
dures. 83 Most of the differences between the Michigan and Illinois proce-
dures are not due to inherent distinctions between the two-tier and unitary
systems of judicial discipline. Investigatory methods, rules of evidence and
burden of proof are matters to be decided within the particular jurisdiction
regardless of the model system implemented. For example, both the Illinois
two-tier plan and the Michigan unitary plan provide for confidential investi-
gations to be made public upon the filing of the complaint, s4 while the
California unitary system provides that confidential investigations and hear-
ings must be made public only when the record is filed with its state supreme
court. 85 Similarily, the composition of commission membership, methods of
appointment or election, and length of terms are specifications to be made
within the rules and constitutional provisions of each state. The unitary and
two-tier systems do not demand different regulations regarding those mat-
ters and most decisions on those issues are applicable in either type of
system.
There are two major differences inherent in the structural framework
and philosophy of the two-tier system which distinguishes it from the
unitary system. These are: (1) the segregation of the judicial discipline
process from the state court system; and (2) the separation of the two boards
from each other.
77. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 15(b).
78. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 15(c).
79. Id.
80. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 15(e).
81. ILL. CONST. art. 6, §§ 15(e) and 15(f).
82. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 15(f).
83. ILL. CONST. art. 6, §§ 15(d) and 15(g).
84. ILL. CONST. art. 6, §§ 15(c), 15(e); ILL. JUDICIAL INQUIRY BD. R. 5(a); MICH. GEN. CT.
R. 932.8(h) and 932.22(b).
85. CAL. CT. R. 902.
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Segregation From The Court System
The two-tier system stresses independence of judicial discipline proce-
dures from the regular court system while the unitary plan works within the
court system of the state. For example, the Illinois Courts Commission is
not accountable to the courts of Illinois. 86 Its decisions are neither appeal-
able nor reviewable.87 Michigan, typical of unitary plan jurisdictions, re-
quires its state supreme court to independently review and rule on Commis-
sion recommendations for discipline resulting from the hearings.88 Such
review is conducted as part of the regular supreme court docket.
Both the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board and the Michigan Commission
consist of lawyers and lay people.8 9 Also, final disciplinary actions are made
by boards entirely comprised of judges in both Illinois and Michigan. In
Illinois it is the independent Courts Commission 9° while in Michigan it is the
state supreme court. 91 Two-tier advocates argue that the feature of being
detached facilitates more objective decision making than the unitary ap-
proach of keeping judicial discipline within the court system.
It is submitted that segregation is the pitfall of the two-tier system.
Perhaps the most highly publicized and critized judicial disciplinary case is
In re Harrod. 92 In that case, the independent Illinois Courts Commission
suspended a trial judge for one month upon a finding that the judge was
imposing improper probation conditions. The central issue in Harrod was
the question of when judicial discipline may be imposed with respect to
conduct reviewable in the normal appellate process. The Illinois Courts
Commission held that it would review such cases when, in their opinion,
there was a gross abuse of judicial power. 93
The Harrod case demonstrates that issues involving judicial miscon-
duct are oftentimes interrelated with questions of judicial discretion; tradi-
tionally legal questions that can be resolved through the normal court
process. Because legal and disciplinary issues occasionally overlap and
conflict, it is submitted that state supreme courts should review such deci-
sions. Public confidence in the courts is premised somewhat on legal
86. As pointed out in note 26, supra, the Commission is funded with supreme court
appropriations. In Illinois, the General Assembly appropriates funds for both the Illinois
Inquiry Board and the Courts Commission. ILL. CONsr. art. 6, §§ 15(d) and 15(g). Of course,
there is no requirement that a unitary system be funded by the court system.
87. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 15(f).
88. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
89. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 15(b); MICH. CoNsT. art. 6, § 30(1).
90. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 15(e).
91. MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 30(2).
92. No. 76 CC 3 (II1. Cts. Comm'n Dec. 3, 1976).
93. Id. at 8.
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consistency and the unitary system contributes to this end by eliminating the
potential for conflict.
Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court mandated a reversal of Harrod's
suspension.94 The court held that "only conduct violative of the Supreme
Court Rules of Judicial Conduct may be the subject of a complaint before
the Commission." 9
5
Although the Illinois Supreme Court heard Harrod's case, it is submitt-
ed that the potential for conflict is lessened when the court is involved
directly in the procedure as in the unitary system. The friction resulting from
the Harrod case illustrates the impracticality of the two-tier system which is
segregated from the courts.
The only situation where state supreme court review is not preferable is
when a supreme court justice is the respondent in a discipline action. The
closeness of the members of the court and the great possibility that the other
justices may know facts in addition to the evidence presented subject such
disciplinary decisions to possible conflict of interest problems. To remedy
this problem, California has added a constitutional provision creating a
panel of randomly selected appellate judges to review recommendations
regarding discipline of its state supreme court justices. 9' To preserve objec-
tivity, these authors agree with and support the California provision.
Public hearings are time consuming. Because the two-tier philosophy
segregates the disciplinary proceedings from the court, the Courts Commis-
sion must hear all testimony. All judges serving on the Illinois Courts
Commission must find substitutes to cover their normal courtroom respon-
sibilities while presiding over these trial-like hearings. The unitary system
of review of testimony seems to be more economical because the hearings
are usually conducted before one judge or master appointed by the supreme
court. Any formal complaint passed on to the supreme court for final
disposition is placed on the court's docket and decided in the same fashion
as any other appeal.
Separation of Authority Under Two-Tier Systems
The two-tier plan requires that there be a division of power between its
independent, investigative Judicial Inquiry Board and its adjudicatory
Courts Commission.
[T]he Judicial Inquiry Board has neither the right nor the responsi-
bility for determining the guilt or innocence of a judge of any
94. People ex rel. Harrod v. Illinois Courts Comm'n, No. 49118 (111. Nov. 30, 1977).
95. Id.
96. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 18(e) (amended 1976).
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particular charges which may be brought against him, or to impose
sanctions upon any member of the judiciary. . . . Only the five-
judge Courts Commission is empowered to take disciplinary ac-
tion against a judge. It is the sole arbiter of whether sanctions shall
be imposed on a judge. 97
This separation feature distinguishes the two-tier system from the unitary
system with respect to whether two important disiplinary sanctions can be
effectively enforced, those two being private reprimands and interim sus-
pensions.
Private Reprimands
This sanction is a confidential admonishment directed at a judge by the
Commission prior to the filing of the formal public complaint. Under
Michigan's unitary system, the Commission has jurisdiction to issue private
warnings for minor infractions after the "15-day" letter. 9 In issuing such
minor sanctions the Commission does not have to seek the approval of the
state supreme court. This practice aims to correct minor infractions without
proceeding to the public hearing stage.
The two-tier system, on the other hand, is not designed for easy
implementation of such private reprimands. The problem is that the separa-
tion factor leaves neither the Judicial Inquiry Board nor the adjudicatory
Courts Commission with sufficient jurisdiction to implement a private
reprimand while preserving confidentiality at the same time. The Judicial
Inquiry Board's functions are limited to investigating and not sanctioning. 9 9
The adjudicatory Courts Commission is empowered to issue sanctions but
only after the Judicial Inquiry Board has filed a formal public complaint. "
Critics of private reprimands argue that proof of misconduct should be
made public.1 0 ' If the proof is insufficient, then the case should be dismis-
sed. It is also argued that private admonishments serve little purpose be-
cause it is not needed or, if required, the judge is rarely willing to admit a
mistake and correct the problem.
97. ILL. JUDICIAL INQUIRY BD. ANN. REP. 1-2 (1974-1975).
98. This rule was adopted by the Commission pursuant to its independent rule-making
authority. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.2(a). The Commission may adopt such procedures so long as
they do not conflict with the formal rules and procedures. See MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 30.
99. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
100. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 15(e).
101. This article treats private reprimands, private admonishments and station house ad-
justments interchangeably. In Michigan, the procedure is informal; there is no requirement that
guilt be found. There are also no specific rules regarding the procedure. California has recently
amended its court rules to provide specifically for private admonishments. CAL. CT. R. 904(d).
See Greenberg, The Illinois "Two-Tier" Judicial Disciplinary System: Five Years and Count-
ing, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 69 (1977).
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It is submitted, however, that formal hearings are frequently impractic-
al and unnecessary. Oftentimes a judge is unaware of his or her objection-
able behavior and will correct it upon a suggestion from the disciplinary
Commission. 12 Normally, although a judge may disagree with either the
Commission's opinion of what constitutes misconduct or whether he or she
in fact committed such misconduct, the judge will agree to assure the
Commission that it will not happen again. For example, consider the
situation of a very competent, dedicated and fair-minded judge who is in the
habit of taking two-hour lunch breaks and consequently falls unnecessarily
behind on his or her docket. This practice can easily be privately corrected
with a warning from the Commission. If all misconduct required either
dismissal of the case or formal (public) complaint, this type of misconduct
might be dismissed as one of low priority due to the harshness of the remedy
and the problem might be allowed to continue uncorrected. The public is
better served by the Commission discussing the matter with the judge,
admonishing him or her of such behavior and the judge correcting the
problem by shortening the lunch breaks and returning to the business at
hand.
Another common problem is the judge who improperly participates in
questioning of witnesses or inadvertently makes gestures during an attor-
ney's examination or argument. If the judge has the matter brought to his or
her attention by the discipline Commission, he or she is usually quite willing
to make a deliberate effort to avoid such conduct even if the judge is of the
opinion that the alleged misconduct did not overstep the bounds of proper
judicial decorum.
Of course, disciplinary Commissions should continue to monitor such
situations to insure that the judge lives up to his or her promise to conform to
proper standards of conduct. If the problem persists or the judge is unwilling
to assure cooperation with the Commission, formal complaints may become
necessary. In Michigan, however, private admonishments in these situations
have proven to be most successful. 103 Most judges have demonstrated a
willingness to cooperate. Follow-up investigations by the Commission have
shown that problems such as the ones described in the above examples have
been swiftly corrected through the use of private reprimands.104
In short, judicial discipline frequently involves conduct that is neither
illegal nor immoral. It must be remembered that the purpose of judicial
discipline is not to punish but to maintain a high degree of integrity in our
judiciary. It is therefore unnecessary for the judge to be announced to the
102. Citations omitted due to the confidential nature of the proceedings.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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public as being found guilty of misconduct for such minor infractions.
Private admonishments have proven to be a swift and effective alternative to
formal complaints. It is strongly recommended, however, that these private
corrections should only be considered in situations involving correctable
conduct such as laziness, tardiness and intemperance. If the grievance hints
at dishonesty or corruption, then it is urged that private reprimand not be
utilized.
Interim Suspension
This procedural sanction involves temporarily suspending a judge from
his or her adjudicatory responsibilities until final disposition of the case. The
Illinois two-tier system makes no express provision for interim suspen-
sion. 05 Under the Michigan unitary system, however, the Commission may
request such temporary suspension at the time it files its formal complaint
with the state supreme court.10 6
It is not suggested that interim suspension is an impossibility under a
two-tier structure. However, it seems unlikely that the Judicial Inquiry
Board could request an interim suspension since its authority is strictly
limited to investigatory matters. 107 Furthermore, the Courts Commission has
no authority to order suspension prior to hearing the merits of the case. The
Illinois Constitution specifically states that the Courts Commission shall
have the authority to remove, suspend, censure, reprimand or retire a judge
after notice and public hearing. 108 Thus, a provision allowing the Courts
Commission to order interim suspension on its own motion might appear as
a predetermination of guilt. 109 Alternatively, since two-tier disciplinary
procedures are separated from the court system, the state supreme court
would not be able to intervene and order an interim suspension. 10
105. Neither the rules of the Judicial Inquiry Board nor the Courts Commission contain a
provision for a request or order for interim suspension. It is possible that within the court
system of the state, a superior judge could relieve a charged judge of his or her duties pending
final disposition. But see note 7 supra. However, this separate determination of interim
suspension forces the disciplinary system to depend on the court system of the state and may
itself turn into a time consuming fact finding procedure apart from the disciplinary proceedings.
106. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.20.
107. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
108. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 15(e).
109. The rules could provide for automatic interim suspension, thereby absolving discre-
tionary decisions; however, it may not always be desirable. Interim suspension is with pay and,
if a judge is relieved of duty temporarily, someone must be paid as a replacement, meaning that
two salaries are being paid. Many situations may not warrant relief of duties and double
payment of salaries. For instance, a complaint made concerning a judge's practice of law prior
to his or her taking the bench may have nothing to do with his or her capabilities as a judge and
would not require that the judge be suspended temporarily. See text accompanying notes 104-
108 supra for a discussion of when interim suspension is necessary.
110. See note 103 supra. The disciplinary procedure must depend on the court system for
interim suspension because it has no procedure within itself.
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The fact that interim suspension is more workable within the unitary
framework contributes to the preference for unitary plans. For example,
interim suspension is often necessary in situations involving mental incom-
petence in order to insure that possible incompetence is not unnecessarily
continued.
Although the filing of the complaint is in no way a determination of
misconduct, it must be remembered that the mere announcement of disci-
pline proceedings could have a significant impact on trials in progress plus
the judiciary's public image. In situations where the allegations involve
criminal activity or severe judicial misconduct, it is wise to suspend the
judge until a final determination is made. This is necessary to preserve the
public's respect for the judicial system. I II For example, litigants and witnes-
ses might lose sight of the seriousness of a court proceeding in front of a
judge who has been charged with instances of perjury.
Interim suspension might also be necessary in situations where the
judge devotes excessive time to the preparation of a case or is under such
great private pressure that it interferes with the performance of his judicial
duties.
Interim suspension aims at preserving judicial integrity and maintain-
ing public respect pending the outcome of a case involving severe judicial
misconduct or disability. A disciplinary system should have interim suspen-
sion as an option within its own procedure for two reasons: (1) so the system
does not have to rely on other bodies to do the task; and (2) because such a
remedy must be accomplished expeditiously without unnecessary waiting
for the determination to be made elsewhere. In this regard, the unitary
system is more favorable than the two-tier system.
CONCLUSION
Judicial disciplinary systems were formed to provide a continuing
judicial overseer. The goals of such systems are to see that the judiciary
retains its integrity and to preserve public confidence in our judicial system.
In order to achieve such goals it is imperative that these systems are
designed to operate efficiently and effectively.
Two types of disciplinary schemes have evolved among the forty-six
states that have adopted such plans since 1960. The fundamental distinction
between the unitary and the two-tier systems is that the unitary is incor-
porated into a state's established court system while the two-tier consists of
two separate boards which function independently of the state court system.
The unitary system, unlike the two-tier system, affords the state the built-in
111. See In re Del Rio, - Mich. -, -, 256 N.W.2d 727, 734 (1977).
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flexibility to implement two methods of sanctioning: (1) private (confiden-
tial) reprimands; and (2) interim suspensions. The two-tier system does not
facilitate the use of these very important procedural sanctions. The unitary
system is the more efficient and effective approach since it is better able to
achieve the goals of judicial discipline.
